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ABSTRACT 
Numerous studies have demonstrated the robustness of the framing effect in a variety of con-
texts, especially in medical decision making. Unfortunately, research is still inconsistent as to 
how so many variables impact framing effects in medical decision making. Additionally, 
much attention should be paid to the framing effect not only in hypothetical scenarios but also 
in clinical experience. 
 
 
 
FRAMING IN DECISION MAKING 
When making decisions, people will be 
influenced by the different semantic de-
scriptions of the same issue, and have dif-
ferent risk preferences, which is called the 
framing effect indicating that people make 
decisions based on the potential value of 
losses and gains rather than the final out-
come. For example, in the Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1981) landmark study on the 
framing effect, participants were presented 
with a classic framing effect problem, 
named the “Asian Disease” design. The 
scenarios were presented below:  
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for 
the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, 
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimation of the consequences of 
the programs is as follows: 
Positive frame (Lives Saved Frame):  
If Program A is adopted, 200 people 
will be saved.  
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-
third probability that 600 people will be 
saved and a two-thirds probability that no 
people will be saved. 
Which of the two programs would you 
favor? 
Negative frame (Lives Lost Frame): 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people 
will die.  
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-
third probability that nobody will die and a 
two-thirds probability that 600 people will 
die. 
Which of the two programs would you 
favor?  
Obviously, both A and C are the same 
risk-averse options, while B and D are the 
identical risk-seeking options. However, 
participants were more likely to choose the 
risk-averse option (Program A) when con-
fronted with the positive frame, and choose 
the risk-seeking option (Program D) when 
confronted with the negative frame. From 
then on, the framing effect becomes a well-
documented bias in a variety of studies. 
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Since then, numerous studies have demon-
strated the robustness of the framing effect 
in a variety of contexts. We aimed to re-
view literature on framing effect in medical 
decision, and compare the influence of fea-
tures of subjects upon framing effects on 
medical decision making. 
 
DECISION-MAKING THEORIES AND 
THE FRAMING EFFECT 
In early decision-making studies, the 
most popular theories include expected util-
ity theory (EU) and subjectively expected 
utility theory (SEU). These theories base on 
"rational hypothesis" to explain and predict 
human behaviors. It is assumed that deci-
sion makers' capabilities are flawless and 
limitless, and the preferences to the greatest 
expected utility are uninfluenced by the de-
scription of the programs when some basic 
principles are followed, such as ordering 
alternatives, dominance, cancellation, con-
tinuity, and so on (Nelson et al., 2005). 
However, such hypothesis is questioned by 
Simon (1956) who believes that organisms 
adapt well enough to "satisfice"; and they 
do not, in general, "optimize". He also 
points out the concept of "bounded rational-
ity” which means that the individual's cog-
nitive capacity is limited, and he or she is 
unable to seek all of the information and 
weight each option to its probability and 
utility for "optimal" results. As Simon de-
clares, an organism requires only very sim-
ple perceptual and choice mechanisms to 
"satisfy its several needs", and no "utility 
function" needs to be postulated for the or-
ganism, nor does it require any elaborate 
procedure for calculating marginal rates of 
substitution among different wants (Simon, 
1956). Many following studies have indi-
cated that participants make decisions in 
violation of utility theory (Baron, 2000).  
Based on Simon's studies, Tversky and 
Kahneman put forward the famous "Pro-
spect theory" which indicates that potential 
outcomes are weighted in light of the prob-
ability that the outcome will occur, and the 
potential outcomes are considered as either 
gains or losses from a neutral point. Fur-
ther, the existence of the framing effect is 
also confirmed by them with the famous 
original "Asian disease" experiment 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and since 
then, numerous studies have demonstrated 
the robustness of the framing effect in a va-
riety of contexts in which three main types 
of framing effects are put forward: (a) 
Risky choice framing: the classical framing 
effect to influence decision makers' will-
ingness to take risks, like the often cited 
example "Asian disease dilemma"; (b) At-
tribute framing: manipulating the presenta-
tion of a specific characteristic of a subject. 
One of the classical examples is from Levin 
and Gaeth's features of meat described as 
being 25 % fat or as 75 % lean. The de-
scription of 75 % lean meat in a positive 
frame is judged more desirable than the 
negatively framed description of 25 % fat 
meat, suggesting a attribute framing (Levin 
and Gaeth, 1988); (3) Goal framing: the 
impact of persuasive information about out-
comes upon decision makers' behaviors. 
It is also indicated that the framing ef-
fect involves several underlying psycholog-
ical mechanisms, and different perceptual 
or cognitive processes could be employed 
to explain the unique features of the fram-
ing effect. For example, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) propose that three of the 
most common heuristics are utilized by par-
ticipants to make a decision: the representa-
tiveness heuristic, the availability heuristic, 
and the adjustment and anchoring heuristic, 
each of which could give rise to biased de-
cision making. For example, decision mak-
ing would be influenced by the availability 
heuristic, when the participants made medi-
cal decisions based on the most available 
information in their long-term memory 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), although 
the rational options should be chosen by 
thinking over all the pieces of information 
and alternatives relevant to the final deci-
sion. 
According to the Yates and Sieck’s ex-
planations for the presence of the framing 
effect (Yates, 1990; Sieck and Yates, 1997), 
participants often draw a conclusion based 
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simply upon the given information, regard-
less of additional information which is 
worth being incorporating into the final de-
cision making. To avoid the ignorance of 
the unmentioned information during the 
decision making process, the requirements 
of providing justification for their decision 
are necessary for participants (Kim et al., 
2005; Miller and Fagley, 1991). Miu and 
Crişan (2011) reported supportive findings 
that cognitive reappraisal reduced the sus-
ceptibility to framing by effectively regulat-
ing the emotions associated with the deci-
sion frames. 
Stanovich and West (2000) proposed 
that there were two routes for information 
processing: holistic and analytic. In holistic 
process participants made faster conclu-
sions relying on provided cues. Such pro-
cessing allowed individuals to focus on 
contextual and manipulative information, 
which led to a biased decision making. 
Whatever, it has been approved that the 
framing effect overwhelms the basis of ex-
pected utility theory, and intrigues the fol-
lowing researchers to devote themselves to 
this domain. 
 
KEY FACTORS RELEVANT FOR 
FRAMING EFFECTS 
As is well known, older people are the 
ones who are more likely to make very im-
portant and life-threatening medical deci-
sions than any other age group. Some re-
searchers argued that older adults are more 
susceptible to decisional biases than young-
er adults (Park, 1999; Yates & Patalano, 
1999). Similarly, it had also been reported 
that older participants were more likely to 
be susceptible to the framing effect (Kim et 
al., 2005). 
As difference in individual thinking 
styles could account for the variability of 
the framing effect, for instance, participants 
who were able to think all information over 
would avoid the biased decision (McElroy 
and Seta, 2003), Park proposed that age-
related deterioration in cognitive ability and 
impaired information processing could ac-
count for the older participants' engagement 
in biased decision making, though it was 
suggested that older adults' accumulated 
experience and knowledge would minimize 
biases of the decision making (Zwahr, 
1995). Similarly, Yates and Patalano (1999) 
agreed that the older adults' susceptibility to 
the framing effect could be also explained 
by their different ways of thinking, for ex-
ample, it was reported that it costs older 
adults less time to make medical decision 
than younger adults (Leventhal et al., 
1993), relied on less information about 
treatment options (Meyer et al., 1995). In 
other words, the older adults would make 
final decisions faster than the younger, and 
relied mainly on the use of heuristics and 
the holistic approach to decision making. 
However, a recent study failed to find 
the significant difference across age groups 
in intentions to engage in detection behav-
iors (Stoner, 2010). Another study exam-
ined how the type of information used in 
the decision making process varied by 
frame and age. It was found that two main 
decisional strategies were used by all par-
ticipants: (a) one reflected a data-driven de-
cisional process; (b) the other reflected an 
experience-driven process. The results 
showed that older adults were less likely to 
use a data-driven strategy compared to 
younger adults, but only those using a data-
driven strategy demonstrated framing ef-
fects, which implied that the framing effect 
might be more related to decisional strategy 
than to age (Woodhead et al., 2011). Spe-
cifically, Woodhead's study (2006) indicat-
ed that the presence of the framing effect 
was determined not only by the participants' 
ages but also the outcome information 
types. It was shown in this study that the 
framing effect occurred in younger partici-
pants with the cumulative and interval 
probability formats, and in older adults with 
in the interval probability format. Wood-
head’s studies demonstrated the interaction 
between age and other variables which 
could explain the presence and absence of 
the framing effect mentioned above to some 
extent. To sum up, decision makers are in-
fluenced by the framed information, but 
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research is still inconsistent as to whether 
and how age impacts framing effects. 
When older adults or patients make de-
cisions regarding choices of treatment, they 
often turn to relatives or friends for discus-
sion and suggestion. They can hardly make 
final decisions depending solely on them-
selves. Decision-making biases do exist in 
group decisions, for example, sunk-cost bi-
as and confirmation bias (Smith et al., 
1998; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000). Stoner 
(2007) investigated medical decision mak-
ing among older participants (as individual 
or part of dyad) faced with positively or 
negatively framed information (survival or 
mortality) regarding a choice between re-
ceiving surgery or radiation for treating 
lung cancer. Outcome format comprised 
three levels: cumulative probability, inter-
val probability, and total live expectancy. 
This study found that the framing effect oc-
curred not only in older adult individual but 
also older adult collaborative decision mak-
ers in at least one of the three data formats 
presented. Among the participants who 
showed the framing effect, there was no 
difference between the proportion of indi-
vidual and collaborative decision makers. 
What’s more, the influence of group com-
position upon decision making was investi-
gated by Yaniv (2011) who found that, in 
comparison to individual preferences, the 
homogeneous groups’ preferences were po-
larized, and thus the framing effect was 
amplified; in contrast, the heterogeneous 
groups’ preferences converged, and thus the 
framing effect was reduced to zero. 
It has been found that many individual 
difference variables could account for the 
changes of the framing effect in health de-
cisions including impulsiveness, involve-
ment in personal healthcare, and feelings 
towards personal health status (Lauriola et 
al., 2005). Sometimes the effectiveness of 
framed health communications depends on 
the message recipient's current emotional 
state, which has been examined by Gerend 
and Maner (2011). As predicted, partici-
pants in the fear condition reported eating 
more servings of fruits and vegetables after 
exposure to a loss-framed message than to a 
gain-framed message. In contrast, partici-
pants in the anger condition reported eating 
(marginally) more servings of fruits and 
vegetables after exposure to a gain-framed 
message than to a loss-framed message. So 
it was declared by the researchers that af-
fective factors that were incidental to the 
behavior recommended could influence the 
relative success of gain- and loss-framed 
appeals. Another study examined whether 
affective context moderated the degree to 
which message frame was associated with 
behavioral intentions to engage in colorec-
tal cancer screening. As predicted, they 
found that loss-framed messages were more 
effective in increasing intentions to screen. 
However, among individuals who received 
gain-framed messages (but not loss-framed 
messages), the affective booster increased 
message persuasiveness, which was partial-
ly mediated by self-efficacy for engaging in 
screening. This study indicated that in the 
presence of emotional boosters, loss-framed 
messages might lose their advantage over 
gain-framed messages in motivating detec-
tion behaviors (Ferrer et al., 2012). In addi-
tion, relationship between emotion and risk-
seeking were also discussed, and the find-
ings demonstrated a general role for emo-
tion reliance on risk-seeking and a specific 
role of positive effect on risk-seeking in the 
loss trials of the framing effect (Cheung and 
Mikels, 2011). Collectively, there is grow-
ing evidence elucidating the relationship 
between emotion and the framing effect in 
decision making, especially medical or 
health-related decision. 
It is noticeable that sex could modulate 
the orientation of the framing effect upon 
health-related behaviors. It was observed 
that males and females might make differ-
ent responses to the same information, for 
instance, among male adults, higher will-
ingness to engage in health behaviors was 
induced by the negatively framed messages 
than the positively framed messages, while 
the negative frame elicited lower intentions 
to the prevention behaviors than the posi-
EXCLI Journal 2013;12:20-29 – ISSN 1611-2156 
Received: November 28, 2012, accepted: January 08, 2013, published: January 18, 2013 
 
24 
tive frame among female participants 
(Rothman et al., 1993).  
As a matter of fact, sex interacted with 
other variables to predict preference to 
medical choices. Huang and Wang (2010) 
investigated how task domain moderated 
sex differences in framing effects, and they 
found that the framing effect was sex-
specific, varying according to the gender 
role in different task domains, which high-
lighted the necessity to distinguish, rather 
than combine, individual judgments and 
decision makings in different task domains 
when investigating framing effects. Further, 
another recent study explored individual 
differences in perspective taking and per-
spective as moderators of risky choice 
framing effects. The researchers expected 
the affective focus would magnify framing 
effects among men, as they appeared less 
likely to spontaneously consider how they 
would feel, which was supported in follow-
up analyzes of the five-way interaction of 
frame, gender, feel, cognitive and affective 
perspective taking. Such findings suggested 
that larger framing effects seen for women 
in previous research may be due to differ-
ences in whether one spontaneously consid-
ered how one would feel, that is, to individ-
ual differences in affective perspective tak-
ing (Fagley et al., 2010).  
As is well known, bipolar disorder (BD) 
is associated with high-risk behaviors, such 
as gambling and impulsivity. Some re-
searchers studied the effects of highlighting 
rewards versus highlighting punishments in 
the risky decision making of euthymic indi-
viduals with bipolar disorder. They found 
that the number of bad outcomes arising out 
of positively framed dilemmas was overes-
timated by the BD participants, and the 
framing effect shown in healthy control 
participants was significantly attenuated in 
BD participants, which indicated that risky 
choice in BD was associated with reduced 
sensitivity to emotional contexts that high-
lighted rewards or punishments, possibly 
reflecting altered valuations of prospective 
gains and losses associated with behavioral 
options (Chandler et al., 2009). Similarly, it 
was also observed in autistic individuals 
that the framing bias was attenuated. The 
researchers explained that the framing ef-
fect merged in early adolescence as gist-
based intuition developed, and the autistic 
participants relied more on verbatim-based 
analysis and less on gist-based intuition 
(Reyna and Brainerd, 2011). 
In contrast, the framing effect between 
healthy older adults, patients with mild 
cognitive impairment (MCI), and patients 
with mild Alzheimer's disease (AD) were 
compared by researchers, and they found 
that all three groups showed framing effects 
and judged more favorably the positively-
framed medications than the negatively-
framed medications. However, framing ef-
fects were more pronounced in MCI pa-
tients and mild AD patients than in healthy 
older adults, which suggested that health-
related decisions of patients with slight 
cognitive impairment might be relevantly 
biased by positive and negative formula-
tions (Zamarian et al., 2010). Interestingly, 
it was reported that two patients with Ur-
bach-Wiethe (UW) disease exhibited an 
intact framing effect. However, choice 
preference in these patients did show a 
qualitatively distinct pattern compared to 
controls. As it was suggested by two fMRI 
studies that the activation in the amygdala 
was modulated by the framing effect, it was 
implied that loss of amygdala function did 
exert an overall influence on risk-taking 
(Talmi et al., 2010). 
Numeracy skill is defined as an ability 
to understand and manipulate basic proba-
bilities, ratios, and percentiles (Peters et al., 
2006). Such skill has been measured in 
many health and decision making studies, 
because it exerts effect upon medical deci-
sion making (Donelle et al., 2007). As 
Reyna and Brainerd (2007) went, due to 
their lack of understanding of risk and 
probabilities in medical decision making, 
less numerate adults were likely to be bi-
ased and at disadvantage. However, Stoner 
(2010) tried to investigate the effect of nu-
meracy upon engagement in prevention be-
haviors, and failed to find the significant 
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difference across numeracy ability groups. 
Another study investigated whether numer-
acy influenced risk perceptions when dif-
ferent information frames and number for-
mats were used to present medication risks. 
Unfortunately, it was reported that numera-
cy did not moderate these framing effects 
(Peters et al., 2010). Noticeably, there is 
growing evidence that numeracy skill puts 
impact upon decisions in attribute framing 
(Peters et al., 2006), but few studies exam-
ined the effect of numeracy skill as influ-
encing factors upon health-related behav-
iors. 
Participants' prior experiences with the 
medical decision and the indirect 
knowledge from their relatives or friends 
could be considered as positive factors to 
help them to make well-informed and unbi-
ased medical decisions. In other words, 
adults could be protected by such prior ex-
periences and knowledge from the influ-
ence of the framing effect (Hughes, 1993). 
According to adults' sensitivity to nega-
tive affairs, fun seeking, and rewards 
(BIS/BAS scale; Carver and White, 1994), 
participants could be divided into the group 
with approach motivation who were moti-
vated by incentives, and the group with 
avoidance motivation who were propelled 
by potential punishment. It had been 
demonstrated that the former group was 
easily promoted to engage in health-related 
behaviors by positive information, while 
the latter group was more likely to be moti-
vated to perform such behaviors by nega-
tively framed information than positively 
framed information (Mann et al., 2004). 
A recent study examined the effects of 
gain- and loss-framed messages on HIV-
testing intentions moderated by perceived 
risk of a positive result. Their findings 
demonstrated an advantage for the loss-
framed message among women with some 
perceived risk and an advantage for the 
gain-framed message among women with 
low perceived risk, which implied that risk 
perception was an important moderator of 
framing effects (Hull, 2012).  
In addition, some researchers investi-
gated the joint effect of message framing 
and time perspective in adherence-
promoting communication targeting pa-
tients with chronic diseases, and they found 
that the gain frame showed an advantage 
over the loss frame among future-oriented 
patients, whereas the framing effect was 
relatively indistinct for present-oriented pa-
tients, which corroborated the hypotheses 
proposed from previous framing and time 
perspective research (Zhao et al., 2012). 
 
MANY VARIABLES AND  
INCONSISTENT FINDINGS 
Many studies have confirmed the fram-
ing effect (Kim et al., 2005, LeBoeuf and 
Shafir, 2003; Mayhorn et al., 2002), how-
ever, others failed to report the presence of 
the framing effect (McElroy and Seta, 
2003; Sieck and Yates, 1997; Takemura, 
1994). Many studies were inconsistent in 
their methodology, which also led to the 
different conclusions and findings in the 
presence of the framing effect. As men-
tioned above, there are so many variables 
influencing the framing effect in medical 
decision making, and most of the variables 
interact with others. However, a majority of 
studies are only able to investigate several 
influencing factors, because the more vari-
ables they concern, the more participants 
and questionnaires are demanded in these 
studies. Therefore, large-scale joint re-
searches, with regard to variables as many 
as possible, are needed to draw the reliable 
and consistent conclusions of the framing 
effect in medical decision making. 
 
ACTUAL PROBLEMS ARE OFTEN 
MORE COMPLEX THAN THOSE  
DESIGNED IN EXPERIMENTS 
Tversky and Kahneman's prospect theo-
ry can be often used to explain the framing 
effect, namely, the possible outcomes will 
be coded by people as "gain" or "loss". As a 
matter of fact, the actual problems are often 
more complex than those designed in the 
experiments. In their daily lives, people 
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usually find themselves in certain decision-
making situations in which they have to be 
confronted with both "gain" and "loss" sim-
ultaneously. 
 
CLASSICAL FRAMING EFFECTS 
AND DECISION THEORIES FROM 
THE WESTERN MIGHT NOT BE 
SUITABLE FOR THE CHINESE  
PEOPLE 
As is well known, human being is of 
sociality, which demonstrates that his or her 
decision making will be determined by liv-
ing style, cultural background, demographic 
differences, and so on. Therefore, Classical 
framing effects and decision theories from 
the Western might not be suitable for the 
Chinese people, and we have no choice but 
explore the Chinese risk preferences under 
different circumstances in China. 
Although there have been thousands of 
studies of framing effects in medical deci-
sion making in the Western, there is few 
studies of framing effects in Asia, especial-
ly in medical decision making. In Asia, 
very a few relevant studies concerning the 
framing effect are almost limited to the do-
mains of finance, administration, etc. To 
sum up, the research about the application 
of the framing effect to the medical deci-
sion in Asia is scarce. 
All in all, the framing effect has been 
observed in more and more studies about 
medical decision making. However, there is 
still discrepancy in the previous literature, 
because so many variables and factors in-
fluence the presence of the framing effect in 
medical decision making. Much effort is 
needed to explore the relationship between 
the features of subjects and framing effect 
in medical decision making, especially in 
Asia, and there is still a long way to go. 
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